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Abstract—We present an industrial case study that demonstrates 
the practicality and effectiveness of Symbolic Quick Error 
Detection (Symbolic QED) in detecting logic design flaws (logic 
bugs) during pre-silicon verification. Our study focuses on several 
microcontroller core designs (~1,800 flip-flops, ~70,000 logic 
gates) that have been extensively verified using an industrial 
verification flow and used for various commercial automotive 
products. The results of our study are as follows: 
1. Symbolic QED detected all logic bugs in the designs that were 
detected by the industrial verification flow (which includes various 
flavors of simulation-based verification and formal verification). 
2. Symbolic QED detected additional logic bugs that were not 
recorded as detected by the industrial verification flow. (These 
additional bugs were also perhaps detected by the industrial 
verification flow.) 
3. Symbolic QED enables significant design productivity 
improvements: 
(a) 8X improved (i.e., reduced) verification effort for a new design 
(8 person-weeks for Symbolic QED vs. 17 person-months using the 
industrial verification flow). 
(b) 60X improved verification effort for subsequent designs (2 
person-days for Symbolic QED vs. 4-7 person-months using the 
industrial verification flow). 
(c) Quick bug detection (runtime of 20 seconds or less), together 
with short counterexamples (10 or fewer instructions) for quick 
debug, using Symbolic QED. 
 
Keywords— Bounded Model Checking, Formal verification, Pre-
silicon verification, Symbolic Quick Error Detection 
1. What is the objective of this industrial case study? 
Pre-silicon verification is used to detect logic design flaws 
(logic bugs) before integrated circuits (ICs) are manufactured. 
This study focuses on logic bugs. The reasons for this focus are: 
(a) Due to rapidly growing design complexity, pre-silicon 
verification accounts for a significant fraction of overall design 
effort [Foster 15]. Despite major progress, critical logic design 
bugs frequently escape pre-silicon verification and are detected 
after ICs are manufactured, during post-silicon validation or 
during system operation.  
(b) Bug escapes that are detected during system operation 
in the field can have disastrous consequences, especially for 
critical domains such as automotive applications. 
(c) During post-silicon validation, it can be extremely time-
consuming and expensive to detect, localize, diagnose, and fix 
bugs. Hence, it is crucial that logic bugs are detected and fixed 
during pre-silicon verification. 
Symbolic Quick Error Detection (Symbolic QED) [Lin 15, 
Singh 18] is a new approach to pre-silicon verification. Key 
characteristics of Symbolic QED are:  
(a) It is applicable to any System-on-Chip (SoC) design 
containing at least one programmable processor core (a 
generally valid assumption).  
(b) It is broadly applicable for logic bugs inside processor 
cores, accelerators, and uncore components1.   
(c) Although it is based on Bounded Model Checking 
(BMC) [Clarke 01], it does not require design-specific properties 
to be (manually) created. 
(d) Despite use of BMC, it achieves fast runtimes and 
scales to billion transistor-scale designs. 
(e) Results obtained using a wide variety of designs (from 
processor cores and accelerators to multi-core chips) 
demonstrate the effectiveness of  Symbolic QED and its 
extensions for logic bugs and security threats [Fadiheh 18, 19, 
Ganesan 18, Lin 15, Singh 18]. 
We conducted this industrial case study to demonstrate the 
practicality and effectiveness of Symbolic QED for pre-silicon 
verification in an industrial setting. The specific questions that 
motivated our study are: 
(a) What logic bugs does Symbolic QED detect (vs. those 
detected by state-of-the-art industrial verification flows)? 
(b) How much (manual) effort is required to implement 
Symbolic QED in an industrial setting? 
(c) How much time and compute resources are required to 
run Symbolic QED?  
2. What designs were analyzed? 
To analyze the effectiveness of Symbolic QED, we 
selected industrial designs with the following characteristics: 
(a) Industrial microcontroller cores that have been 
thoroughly verified (over 5 years) using industrial verification 
techniques (especially since they target automotive 
applications). Thus, logic bugs detected (or not detected) by 
Symbolic QED can be extensively characterized. 
(b) Availability of multiple designs, based on the same 
Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), to estimate the effort 
required in applying Symbolic QED to a new design (i.e., with 
an ISA for which it has not yet been used) vs. reusing Symbolic 
QED for subsequent designs (with the same ISA). 
(c) Availability of one or more versions of each design 
(with RTL updates to fix bugs and add features) to analyze the 
effectiveness of Symbolic QED at various stages of design 
maturity, and also to characterize (pre-silicon) debug effort 
associated with Symbolic QED. 
The three microcontroller core designs selected for this 
study, referred to as Designs A, B and C (Fig. 1), have been 
used in various automotive products. All three designs are 
derived from Design 1 (Fig. 1), and they include various 
features targeting specific commercial products. For each 
design, the older RTL versions are also shown in Fig. 1 for 
completeness. For this case study, however, we had access to a 
few most recent versions of each design (Fig. 1). Hence, we 
have no information about the verification effort involved / 
bugs detected in the first i, j and k versions of Designs A, B and 
                                                             
1  components in an IC that are not processor cores or co-
processors, e.g., interconnect fabrics, cache / memory controllers. 
C, respectively. Overall, we have 16 versions for this study: 
A.v[i+1], …, A.v[f], B.v[j+1], …, B.v[f],  C.v[k+1], …, C.v[f]. 
Each version reflects an RTL update to add a feature and/or fix 
a bug. Not all logic bugs were fixed in RTL (e.g., some bugs 
were deemed to be in the design specification and were fixed 
there). 
Each design contains approximately 1,800 flip-flops and 
70,000 logic gates, and implements a custom ISA with over 50 
instructions. The designs also implement built-in safety 
mechanisms and are classified as ASIL-rated (Automotive 
Safety Integrity Level) [ISO 26262].  
There were no logic bugs reported from either post-silicon 
validation or field return for the final versions of each design.  
3. How was the industrial verification flow implemented? 
For each design version, the industrial verification flow 
used three verification techniques detailed below. 
A. Directed Simulation Tests (DST) 
During design stage, designers manually create testbenches 
to simulate directed test cases using commercial simulation 
tools. The overall objective of these tests is to verify specific 
features or functions. Typical checks include: 
(a) Transitions between various states (e.g., reset, built-in-
self-test, flush, restart, fetch, execute). 
(b) Various “classes” of instructions, e.g., single- and dual-
opcode instructions. 
Directed tests are not meant to comprehensively verify the 
RTL. As a result, logic bugs escape these tests. Bugs detected by 
DST were fixed immediately by designers and were not 
recorded. Hence, those bugs aren’t included in this study. 
B. Our Case Study - Formal Verification (OCS-FV) 
The verification team applied formal verification using 
properties generated by an in-house automation framework. We 
refer to this specific approach as Our Case Study – Formal 
Verification (OCS-FV). Details about the in-house automation 
framework can be found in [Ecker 14]. OCS-FV creates a 
property for each instruction, and then proves each such 
property for the microcontroller core. An example property for 
the “ADD” instruction is shown in Fig. 2.   
OCS-FV properties are different from Single-Instruction 
properties, introduced later in the context of Symbolic QED 
(explained in Question 5.C). A significant challenge in OCS-
FV is to avoid false failures due to the interactions with 
multiple instructions. For example, the property shown in Fig. 2 
does not specify if any (or which) instruction is in the execute 
stage at timepoint ‘t’ (when the ADD instruction is decoded). 
As a result, the BMC tool is free to assign any (arbitrary) 
instruction to the execute stage at timepoint ‘t’ while searching 
for a counterexample for the property check_add_instruction. 
Suppose that the BMC tool assigns a branch instruction to the 
execute stage at timepoint ‘t’ and that branch causes the ADD 
instruction (which entered the pipeline via branch prediction) to 
be flushed; the property will fail – a false failure. Thus, extreme 
care must be taken to exclude such false failures. An additional 
constraint (line 3 in Fig. 2) avoids this particular case. There 
can be many such false failure scenarios that must be avoided 
by adding (manual) constraints. The resulting constraints can 
over-constrain the design, leading to bug escapes. 
 
 
1 property check_add_instruction is 
2 assume: 
3  at t: branch_flag = ‘0’;    // Manually added constraint 
4 at t: instruction = ADD; 
5 at t: core_state = decode; 
6 prove: 
7 at t+1: core_state = execute; 
8 at t+1: result = op1 + op2; 
9 at t+2: regfile_data_in = result @ t+1; 
10 endproperty;  
Fig. 2. OCS-FV property example for ADD instruction. 
C. Constrained Random Simulation (CRS) 
This verification step uses simulation testbench built 
following the Universal Verification Methodology (UVM) 
[UVM 17]. Designers, architects, and verification engineers 
first create a verification plan that includes various aspects: 
specific tests and methods, tools, completion criteria, resources 
(person, hardware, software), functions to be verified, functions 
not covered, etc. Verification engineers then create test cases 
(e.g., in SystemVerilog) based on the verification plan. 
Obviously, the thoroughness of such test cases depends on the 
verification plan.  The completion criterion is often guided by 
code coverage and functional coverage metrics [Wile 05]. A 
significant challenge is to ensure the thoroughness of the 
verification plan and the corresponding test cases. 
4. What effort was required to set up and run verification 
techniques in the industrial verification flow?  
DST Setup: For Design 1.v1 – 1.v[f] (Fig. 1), DST 
consumed an overall effort of 10 person-months. For each 
subsequent Design A-C, DST consumed an overall effort of 1-3 
person-months for v1 to v[f]. Note that, it is difficult to isolate 
DST effort from general design effort since DST is applied by 
designers. 
DST Runtime: For DST, a commercial simulator on an Intel 
Xeon E5-2690 v3 @ 2.6GHz with 32GB RAM took 
approximately 1 hour to simulate all directed test cases (for each 
design version). 
Fig. 1. Designs analyzed in this study. 
OCS-FV Setup: For Design 1.v1, OCS-FV consumed 4 
person-months of effort. For subsequent designs A.v1, B.v1 and 
C.v1, it took 1 person-month effort to update existing properties. 
Between design versions (e.g., A.v[2] – A.v[f]), the properties 
did not require significant updates, usually less than 1 person-
hour of effort.  
OCS-FV Runtime: For OCS-FV, Onespin 360 DV Verify 
(version 2016.12) on an Intel(R) Xeon E5-2690 v3 @ 2.6GHz 
with 32GB RAM took approximately 3 hours to run the full set 
of properties (for each design version). 
CRS Setup: CRS first targeted Design 1.v[m]. The overall 
process from Design 1.v[m] to Design 1.v[f] consumed 12 
person-months of effort. The CRS was carefully designed to be 
extremely thorough. For subsequent designs A-C, the 
testbenches were mostly reused (with appropriate 
modifications). For each subsequent design A-C, it took 3-6 
person-months of work to update the testbenches over all 
versions (e.g., A.v[m]-A.v[f]). 
CRS Runtime: For CRS, a commercial simulator on an Intel 
Xeon E5-2690 v3 @ 2.6GHz with 32GB RAM took 
approximately 24 hours (for each design version). 
Note that, the simulation runtime to detect a bug can be 
shorter than running the entire set of tests (not recorded in our 
study). 
 
5. How was Symbolic QED implemented for this study?  
An overview of Symbolic QED is presented in the Appendix 
with emphasis on: (a) EDDI-V (Error Detection using 
Duplicated Instructions for Validation) transformation; (b) the 
QED module (added to the fetch unit of a processor core during 
BMC) which is only used by the BMC tool (i.e., it is not added 
to the manufactured chip). As also explained in the Appendix 
A.1, Symbolic QED needs to start from a QED-consistent 
architectural state to avoid false failures. We used a starting state 
with the core in operating mode, the pipeline empty, and all 
registers and memory locations equal to 0. For our designs, 
these conditions ensure that (in the absence of a bug) QED 
sequences from this state execute correctly. We used the QED 
module (Appendix A.2) from [Ganesan 18] (seen in Fig. 4(a)), 
which is an enhanced version of the QED module in [Lin 15, 
Singh 18]. We further enhanced EDDI-V as follows.  
A. Enhanced EDDI-V: Control flow errors 
We extended EDDI-V to detect bugs that cause control flow 
errors (control flow bugs) as well. The CFCSS-V Symbolic 
QED property [Singh 18] detects some control flow bugs, but 
misses those causing incorrect branch directions. In our 
Enhanced EDDI-V approach targeting control flow errors, we 
use a QED-Control Flow (QED-CF) module (Fig. 5) which is 
instantiated between the QED module (from [Ganesan 18] 2) 
and the instruction fetch (IF) stage of the core (Fig. 4). The 
QED-CF module captures the target address of each control 
flow instruction (branch or jump), and compares the target of 
an original control flow instruction with the corresponding 
duplicate instruction. If the targets match, BMC continues with 
the QED sequence. Upon mismatch, the BMC tool can inject 
any instruction (it chooses), to represent an incorrect control 
flow – this injected instruction then causes an EDDI-V QED 
check failure. In Fig. 3, the bug causes the duplicate sequence 
to incorrectly take the conditional branch BEQZ (branch if 
previous result is equal to zero). Since the target address of the 
original branch (2) mismatches with the duplicated branch (5), 
                                                             
2 The designs in this study did not feature interrupts or generate 
stalls. As a result, the fetch_next signal of the QED module was 
constrained to 0 using the BMC tool. 
the BMC tool chooses to execute the load immediate 
instruction in address 5 (instead of the ADD instruction in 
address 2), causing a QED check failure (R4 vs. R12).   
 
Original Sequence 
R2 = 2, R3 = 1 
 
0: R1  = R2 - R3 
1: BEQZ   #5 
  // R1 != 0 
  // Branch not taken 
2: R4  = R2  + R3 
  // R4 = 3 
Duplicate Sequence 
R10 = 2, R11 = 1 
 
0: R9  = R10 - R11 
1: BEQZ   #5 
  // R9 != 0   
  // Error: Branch taken 
  // Ignore QED instruction 
  // 2: R12 = R10 + R11 
  // Use Non-QED instruction 
5: LD R12 0    
  // R12 = 0 
Fig. 3. Enhanced EDDI-V: control flow errors example.  
 
 
Fig. 4. The location (a) of the QED module, and (b) with the 
QED-CF module inserted.  
 
To avoid false failures, our QED-CF module imposes two 
conditions: (a) for control flow instructions that use conditional 
flags (e.g., branch if previous instruction result is zero, as in 
Fig. 3), an original (duplicate) control flow instruction can only 
follow an original (duplicate) instruction; (b) the instruction 
following an original (duplicate) control flow instruction must 
also be an original (duplicate) instruction. The second condition 
ensures that if a control flow instruction causes a pipeline flush, 
only the next instruction from the same sequence (original or 
duplicate) will be flushed with it (our microcontroller core 
designs contain 2-stage pipelines). These conditions are 
sufficient for in-order, 2-stage cores, the designs analyzed in 
this study. 
The inputs to the QED-CF module are: 1) qed_valid, output 
of the QED module (shown in Fig. 4); 2) qed_instruction, 
output of the QED module; 3) original, BMC signal (also an 
input to the QED module) to execute an original (when high) or 
duplicate (when low) instruction; 4) target_address, the next 
instruction address (next_instr_addr in Fig. 4) fetched by the IF 
stage; 5) any_instr, a valid, unconstrained instruction selected 
by the BMC tool but importantly not duplicated by the QED 
module. The outputs are 1) valid_out, the valid bit from the 
QED module 2) instruction_out, the instruction fetched by the 
IF stage to execute in the pipeline. The internal variables are: 1) 
orig_queue, a queue data structure that stores target address of 
the original branch instructions; 2) is_CF, determines if 
qed_instruction is a valid control flow instruction; 3) was_CF, 
is is_CF buffered by 1 cycle to let the branch execute; 4) 
was_orig, is original buffered by 1 cycle to let the branch 
execute; 5) head_target, the previous head of the queue; 6) 
match, true when the duplicate control flow instruction target 
matches original instruction target; 7) orig_nCF_match, true 
for original instructions, non-control flow duplicate 
instructions, or control flow duplicate instructions that match 
the original target. Depending on this value, instruction_out 
either outputs the next qed_instruction to the IF stage or the 
unconstrained instruction from the BMC tool, any_instr. This 
QED-CF module is designed for a 2-stage in-order pipeline.  
 
INPUT: qed_valid, qed_instruction, original, target_address, any_instr 
OUTPUT: valid_out, instruction_out  
 
// internal variable initialization 
orig_queue  0; 
was_CF  0; 
was_orig  0; 
// end initialization 
valid_out  qed_valid; 
is_CF  qed_instruction[opcode_bits] = CF_opcode ? qed_valid : 0 
was_CF  is_CF;                   // buffer by 1 cycle till branch executes 
was_orig  original;              
if (was_orig && was_CF):          //when original branch executes 
   orig_queue.push(target_address);    // store branch target in queue 
else if(!was_orig && was_CF):   // when duplicate branch executes 
   head_target  orig_queue.pop();      // remove target at queue head 
   match  (orig_target = head_target) ? 1 : 0;      //check target 
orig_nCF_match   was_orig | !was_CF | match; 
instruction_out  orig_nCF_match ? qed_instruction : any_instr; 
Fig. 5. Pseudo code for QED-CF module. 
 
B. Enhanced EDDI-V: Duplication using memory 
Unlike the EDDI-V overview in Appendix A.1, we may 
choose to not divide the register space into two halves. Instead, 
the (original and) duplicate values may be (temporarily) stored 
in memory (Fig. 6) for various reasons: certain instructions may 
only use specific registers (e.g., load-immediate might only 
load into R0) or a bug may be triggered only when certain 
specific registers are used. The QED module for EDDI-V (in 
[Ganesan 18]) is modified accordingly to insert additional loads 
and stores each time it switches between original and duplicate 
instructions. During this switch, register values for the original 
instructions are first saved in (corresponding) memory 
locations. Next, for the duplicate instruction sequence, source 
registers are loaded from (corresponding) memory locations. 
After the duplicate instruction sequence completes, the updated 
registers are loaded back into memory. A QED check now 
compares contents of corresponding original and duplicate 
memory locations. To avoid unnecessary loads and stores, our 
updated QED module (for Enhanced EDDI-V: duplication 
using memory) tracks registers in use with two bits per register: 
a source and a destination bit. Initialized to 0, the source 
(destination) bit is set to 1 if the register content is used as 
source operand (or written to as destination). If a source bit is 1, 
the register doesn’t need to be reloaded from memory. If a 
destination bit is 1, then the register shouldn’t be loaded from 
memory and should to be written back to memory at the end of 
the sequence.  These bits are reset (to 0) at each transition 
between original and duplicate instruction sequences. 
 
Original Sequence 
//Load source reg 
LD  R2, [R2_orig_mem] 
LD  R3, [R3_orig_mem] 
R1  = R2  + R3 
LD  R5, [R5_orig_mem] 
R4 = R5 – R2 
R1 = R2 + R4 
//Store updated reg 
ST  R1, [R1_orig_mem] 
ST  R4, [R4_orig_mem] 
 
Duplicate Sequence 
//Load source reg 
LD  R2, [R2_dup_mem] 
LD  R3, [R3_dup_mem] 
R1  = R2  + R3 
LD  R5, [R5_dup_mem] 
R4  = R5  – R2 
R1  = R2 + R4 
//Store updated reg 
ST  R1, [R1_dup_mem] 
ST  R4, [R4_dup_mem] 
Fig. 6. QED duplicated sequence using memory.  
C. Single-Instruction Properties (Single-I) 
For each instruction in the ISA, we specify (using System 
Verilog) the expected behavior of that instruction. Any 
instruction operand values are defined symbolically, allowing 
the BMC tool to evaluate the properties for all possible operand 
values. Each such property is verified independently (i.e., when 
the pipeline doesn’t contain other instructions). Hence, it is 
different from OCS-FV (which requires extensive manual work 
to avoid false failures as mentioned in Question 3.C). 
Properties similar to Single-I are used in industry, and 
automated approaches such as [Reid 16] may be used for 
generating such properties. 
 
6. How long did it take to set up & run Symbolic QED? 
Setup for Design A 
Symbolic QED setup (using EDDI-V and the QED module 
in [Ganesan 18]) took 4 person-weeks (referred to as Symbolic 
QED: EDDI-V in Fig. 7). The primary task involved creating 
the QED module (which required understanding the design and 
the ISA including instruction encoding and register mapping, as 
discussed in Appendix A.2). 
Enhanced EDDI-V for control flow errors and duplication 
using memory required 1 additional person-week each. This 
includes creating a memory model [Ecker 04], which avoids 
dramatic state space increase during BMC. 
Single-I properties for Design A took 2 person-weeks. 
While we used a manual approach, automated techniques 
(Question 5.C) may be used.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Effort required for Symbolic QED setup.  
 
Setup for subsequent Designs B and C 
Adapting the EDDI-V setup (including EDDI-V 
enhancements) from Design A to Designs B and C required one 
person-day each. There were two significant design changes 
between Design A vs. Designs B and C: single-ROM interface 
in B and C (vs. dual-ROM interface in A), one additional 
instruction in B and C (vs. A). Adapting Single-I properties 
(manually) from Design A to Designs B and C took 1 person-
day each. 
Between design versions, it took practically no effort to 
adapt Symbolic QED (1 person-hour or less). 
As shown in Table 1, Symbolic QED setup for the initial 
design took significantly less effort (8 person-weeks) vs. OCS-
FV and CRS combined (17 person-months in the best case), 
i.e., by a factor of more than 8X. The benefits are even bigger 
for subsequent designs: 60X (2 person-days using Symbolic 
QED vs. 4-7 person-months using OCS-FV and CRS). Thus, 
Symbolic QED enables drastic improvement (i.e., reduction) in 
verification effort. Since DST efforts in Table 1 include design 
efforts as well and bugs detected by DST (and immediately 
fixed by designers) aren’t reported, we conservatively attribute 
all DST efforts to design. In reality, Symbolic QED can 
potentially reduce DST efforts as well (although we cannot 
quantify that using our study). 
Table 1: Setup effort: industrial verification flow vs. Symbolic 
QED.  
 Total Setup Effort: Initial Design 
Total Setup Effort: 
Subsequent Designs 
DST* 10 person-months 1-3 person-months 
OCS-FV 5 person-months 1 person-month 
CRS 12 person-months 3-6 person-months 
Total 
industrial 
verification flow 
(DST,OCS-FV,CRS) 
27 person-months 
(including DST) 
17 person-months 
(excluding DST) 
5-10 person-months 
(including DST) 
4-7 person-months 
(excluding DST) 
Symbolic QED 8 person-weeks 2 person-days 
* – includes design effort as well 
 
Runtime 
As shown in Table 2 (BMC tool Onespin®, version 
2018.2.1, from Onespin Solutions, running on an Intel(R) 
Xeon(R) E5-2690 v3 @ 2.6GHz with 32GB RAM), Symbolic 
QED with Enhanced EDDI-V (i.e., Enhanced EDDI-V 
targeting control flow errors as well as duplication using 
memory) took between 6 to 12 seconds to generate 
counterexamples. Single-I properties were even faster, finding 
counterexamples in 6 to 8 seconds.  
 
Table 2: Bug Detection Runtime for Symbolic QED.  
 Bug Detection Runtime (sec.) 
[min., avg., max.] 
Symbolic QED with both 
EDDI-V Enhancements 
[6, 8.3, 12] 
Single-I [6, 7.3, 8] 
 
7. What bugs did Symbolic QED detect?  
Symbolic QED detected all logic bugs (Fig. 8) detected by 
the industrial verification flow for all the 16 designs. These 
bugs were related to both the RTL design as well as the design 
specification. The BMC tool generated Symbolic QED 
counterexamples starting from a state where the core is in the 
normal execution mode, the pipeline is empty, and all registers 
and memory location set to 0 (a QED-consistent architectural 
state, as explained in Question 5). The additional 7% in Fig. 8, 
detected uniquely by Symbolic QED, is related to specification 
for Design A.v[f]. Upon review with designers, we suspect that 
this 7% was perhaps also detected using the industrial 
verification flow (but wasn’t reported and the specification 
document wasn’t updated as well). 
 
 
Fig. 8. Bugs detected by Symbolic QED (Enhanced EDDI-V: 
Control flow Errors; Enhanced EDDI-V: Duplication using 
Memory; Single-I) vs. industrial verification flow. 
 
All these bugs were detected by only CRS in the industrial 
verification flow (Fig. 9); they escaped DST and OCS-FV. 
(Recall that bugs detected by DST weren’t recorded, as 
discussed in Question 3.A). Upon detection, additional 
properties were generated manually to try to confirm these bugs 
using BMC; i.e., a specific property was generated for each bug 
a posteriori (after the bug became known). This further 
demonstrates the challenge of creating “good” properties for 
traditional BMC. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Bugs detected by the industrial verification flow.  
 
8.  What bugs did various Symbolic QED features detect? 
In Fig. 10, we show a breakdown of bugs detected by 
various Symbolic QED features discussed in Question 5. 
Symbolic QED using EDDI-V (Appendix A.1, with the 
updated QED module in [Ganesan 18]) detected 35.7% of the 
bugs. Enhanced EDDI-V (Question 5, A and B) uniquely 
detected another 35.7% of the bugs: 28.6% of these bugs 
caused control flow errors with wrong branch directions 
(detected by Enhanced EDDI-V using the QED-CF module) 
and the remaining 7.1% used instructions with a specific 
destination register (detected by Enhanced EDDI-V using 
memory for duplication).  
The remaining 28.6% of bugs were detected by Single-I.  
One would expect the bugs detected by Single-I to be also 
detected by OCS-FV. However, due to human error (stemming 
from ways to cope with false failures as explained in Question 
3.C), the OCS-FV properties missed certain details. As a result, 
the Single-I bugs were not detected by OCS-FV (until after bug 
detection by CRS when the properties were manually updated 
based on the detected bugs, as discussed in Question 7). 
 
 
Fig. 10. Bugs detected by various Symbolic QED features.  
  
9. How long did it take to debug using Symbolic QED? 
The counterexamples generated by Symbolic QED were 
very short (Table 3). As a result, the debug time was similar to 
that of the industrial verification flow (less than a day to 
analyze and fix each bug).  
 
Table 3: Counterexample length for Symbolic QED.  
 Counterexample Length 
 (cycles)  
[min., avg., max.] 
(instructions)  
[min., avg., max.] 
Symbolic QED with 
both EDDI-V 
Enhancements 
[5, 7.4, 11] [4, 6.2, 10] 
Single Instruction [2, 2, 2] [1, 1, 1] 
10. What are some of the Symbolic QED future directions?  
More case studies: While this study uses microcontroller 
cores, case studies on more complex (industrial or open-source) 
SoCs with processor cores, accelerators and uncore components 
can demonstrate further benefits of Symbolic QED. 
Symbolic QED with symbolic starting state: Symbolic 
QED used in this case study uses a fixed starting state 
(Question 5, Appendix A.1). For bugs with very long activation 
sequences, the BMC tool may struggle to unroll the design far 
enough. Symbolic QED with symbolic starting states [Fadiheh 
18, Ganesan 18] can overcome this challenge.   
Hardware security: Techniques influenced by Symbolic 
QED can be highly effective in detecting security 
vulnerabilities in digital systems. Examples include: (a) the 
Unique Program Execution (UPEC) [Fadiheh 19] for detecting 
timing side channel-based security vulnerabilities in processors 
(an active research area, especially after the publication of 
Spectre and Meltdown attacks [Kocker 18, Lipp 18]); and, (b) 
hardware Trojan detection during pre-silicon verification using 
Symbolic QED with symbolic starting states [Ganesan 18]. 
AMS-QED: Symbolic QED techniques may be further 
extended to include analog-mixed-signal (AMS) design blocks, 
as explained in [Gielen 19].  
Bug localization during post-silicon validation and system 
operation: Symbolic QED and E-QED techniques show 
promising results in localizing logic and electrical bugs during 
post-silicon validation and system operation [Singh 17, 18]. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1. Symbolic QED 
Symbolic QED searches all instructions sequences (within the 
BMC bound) and checks whether a QED test [Lin 14] exists that 
could fail. QED tests are based on software transformations that 
systematically ensure that errors created by a bug are detected 
quickly. The property analyzed by BMC is derived from the check 
that would detect the error during a QED test. Here, we focus on the 
EDDI-V (Error Detection using Duplicated Instructions for 
Validation) transformation. EDDI-V divides the registers (and 
memory) into two halves and creates consistent pairs between them, 
e.g. R0 and R16, R1 and R17, etc. It also duplicates instructions, 
creating two sequences (an original and a duplicate instruction 
sequence) that execute independently on each half of the data 
register and memory space. Therefore, an EDDI-V QED test 
starting from a QED-consistent architectural state (where all 
corresponding register and memory pairs are equal to each other, 
with no other instructions left to commit) will then execute the same 
instructions on each half of the registers and memory and, in the 
absence of a bug, result in a QED consistent state once the original 
and duplicate instruction sequences have executed. An 
inconsistency (different values in a register or memory pair) would 
indicate the presence of a bug. As a result, the BMC tool attempts to 
find a counterexample to the following property [Lin 15, Singh 18]:   
𝑞𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦  ⋀ 𝑅𝑎 == 𝑅𝑎′௔∈{଴..೙మିଵ} , 
where n is the number of registers defined by the ISA and 
qed_ready is asserted after the duplicate sequence is done. Here, 
(for a∈{0..n/2-1}), Ra and Ra' correspond to registers allocated for 
original instructions and duplicated instructions, respectively. Other 
QED transformations include CFCSS-V (Control Flow Checking 
using Software Signatures for Validation) targeting control flow 
instructions and CFTSS-V (Control Flow Tracking using Software 
Signatures for Validation) for detecting deadlocks, detailed in 
[Singh 18]. 
A.2. QED Module 
       If a BMC tool does not impose any constraints on its inputs 
while analyzing a design for a counterexample, it may find false 
failures. To address this, environmental constraints (constraints 
that disallow invalid inputs) must be added, often through 
extensive manual effort. In Symbolic QED, the environmental 
constraints are straightforward. Specifically, starting from a QED-
consistent state, the BMC tool must only consider sequences of 
instructions that correspond to QED tests while searching for a 
counterexample. Symbolic QED accomplishes this without 
extensive manual work using two mechanisms: 
1. It constrains the inputs to the instruction fetch unit (of each 
core) to be arbitrary but valid instructions, directly obtained from 
the ISA. 
2. It adds a QED module to the fetch unit of a processor core 
during BMC. The QED module automatically performs the EDDI-
V transformation on-the-fly for any input sequence explored 
during BMC. The QED module is only used within the BMC tool 
and is not added to the manufactured IC; i.e., there is no 
performance/area/power overhead. The QED module is quite 
simple and needs to be designed only once for a given ISA, as 
shown in Question 7.  
Creating the QED module requires understanding of the ISA 
encoding to constrain valid instructions and configure the module 
to transform original instructions into their duplicates. This also 
requires knowledge of the register mapping to ensure original and 
duplicate registers are correctly paired.  
The QED module of [Lin 15, Singh 18] requires that all 
original instructions complete, followed by a waiting period for the 
pipeline to be flushed, and then duplicate instructions execute, 
before the qed_ready signal is asserted. The new QED module, 
used in this case study, from [Ganesan 18], instead allows arbitrary 
interleaving of the original and duplicate instruction subsequences. 
The QED module records the instructions generated by the BMC 
tool in a queue, adding to the queue each next original instruction 
and removing the instruction when its duplicate is executed.  
